Monday, December 8, 2014

AutoCanada - ACQ - An update

Below is an update to the ACQ article I wrote a few months ago.  It was selected for an award at  Please note the article will be open to the public for the next 48 hours. 

The article also explains why I haven't written much in the past few months.  I am currently pursuing my MBA.

Best Regards,

Sunday, August 24, 2014

The Value Proposition by Kim Shannon

One of the perks of having a blog like this is that you get contacted by a wide variety of people.  Most people want to discuss investment ideas, some discuss startups, and some are company executives or directors.  A few months back, I was contacted to do a book review on a home grown Canadian value investor.  Since I love to read I could never turn down a book, particularly one related to value investing.
The book is called The Value Proposition – Sionna’s Common Sense Path to Investment Success written by Kim Shannon (CFA, MBA).  Kim has over 25 years of investment experience as a value investor and since 2002 has served as chief investment officer and president of the firm she founded, Sionna Investment Managers Inc. 
Overall ,I would recommend the book to those who want to understand the fundamentals of the value investing framework.  The book caters to a wide audience and I feel both investors and non-investors will learn something from the book.  One thing I found particularly interesting was the reasons why they talk to the management of the firms they invest in, while most value investors don’t (more below)
The book is divided into three sections.  The first section is an introduction to Kim Shannon and the firm she founded.  The second is about Sionna’s philosophy and the last section is about the how Sionna implements its own take on value investing.
In this article I will describe my key takeaways from the book and a few principles that I found interesting or disagreed with.   

Introduction and History

This section discusses Kim’s unconventional upbringing in a military family.  Which had its positives but also had it's negatives.  The most positive lasting impacts were that she developed independent thinking abilities and wasn’t afraid to stand alone (pg. 11).  These attributes will help any value investor as you must be able to trust your own judgment.  Kim also had a passion for reading and learning.  Those are both cornerstones for personal development and are critical for investment success. 

Sionna’s Philosophy

Sionna is based on a value philosophy and they strive to be client centered.  Although most investment firms say they are client centered, I definitely took away from the book that they have more integrity than most investment firms in this regard.  One of the most important keys to a successful investment management firm is to have clients who both understand and share the investing mindset of the firm.  For value firms, this means underperformance when bull markets are raging and outperformance often comes when markets turn down.  The reason this happens is that value investors have a belief in the rationality of the markets over the long term, but definitely not in the short term. 

When you think about it clearly, companies can’t alter their underlying values to a large degree over the short term, but their share price can fluctuate dramatically.  Companies simply don’t have the capacity to double or triple in a matter of months, but the prices of their shares can.”  (pg. 27)

I couldn’t have agreed more when I read this quote.  People don’t get quotes on land, houses, or other assets they own every hour, but they do get quotes on price of businesses on the stock market every second.  These values can and do rise and fall quite dramatically over short periods of time.  This is what makes value investing successful because if you can successfully value a company and buy at a discount you have much better odds at outperforming those who don’t have a clue as to what they are doing.  And that includes more investment professionals than you realize.   
One key difference from Sionna to other investment firms is that they use a relative value approach.  This means they select stocks from all sectors and also stay invested in bull or bear markets.  They are always looking for the cheapest companies in each sector at all times.  This is particularly important in Canada where resource and financial firms dominate your investment choices. 
The benefits of the relative value approach listed in the book were better diversification and a smoother ride.  The smoother ride is definitely helpful to keep clients from selling out at the wrong times.
While the relative value approach has some benefits I couldn’t help but ask myself, what are the downsides?  This is where I found the book lacked because it didn’t discuss the downside. 
I feel there are a few downsides to this approach.  First of all, a relative value approach may take you into a sector where all companies are overvalued.  Just because a stock is the cheapest in a sector doesn’t mean it is cheap.  It could also be overvalued, so why risk the capital for the sake of diversification?  Secondly, the smoother ride is nice but you can't do this without sacrificing the highest attainable total return.  Personally, I prefer to go where the value is and not be constrained by any sector or requirement to be diversified. 
Some of the other foundations to their approach are reversion to the mean and the sources of total equity returns.  What I found interesting is that in range bound markets (see GDP & Stock Market Returns ) 90% of equity returns comes from dividends.  This makes total sense when you look at a company like Microsoft that has been range bound for more than a decade.  While the company has experienced very strong earnings growth, it has been masked by shrinking multiples (P/E ratio).  In Microsoft’s case the P/E ratio fell from over 40x to under 10x during the last 14 years.  The only return investors in MSFT’s stock have seen (until very recently) was in the form of dividends. 
The book briefly talks about other philosophies such as growth, momentum, speculators and Growth at a Reasonable Price (GARP).  I find GARP to be self-deception at its finest.  I constantly see lots of wannabe value investors turn to “GARP” to justify the purchase of their stocks.  Once you start to talk about “growth” you are now turning from what you know to trying to predict what you don’t know.  Being able to differentiate between what you know and what you don’t know is critical to investing.
On a whole I must say I was greatly drawn to the firm and the principles on which they stand.  I wouldn’t hesitate to send potential clients there way as they appear to have more integrity than most investment managers. 

Implementing Investing at Sionna

This is where the book does a really good job and opened my eyes to help me improve my investing ability.  First of all, the book describes their Intrinsic Value Model (IVM).  You will have to read the book for the details; I can’t give it all to you here.  What I will say is that it involves three major quantitative factors: book value, historical ROE, and relative P/E ratio.  Those are all foundational to my own philosophy, so I almost felt I was reading my own approach to investing. 
I tend to think in terms of slightly different factors, those being: book value, normalized ROE, and relative P/BV.  These are only slightly different ways of thinking about the same quantitative factors they use at Sionna.  
From the three quantitative factors they calculate a rough intrinsic value and expected return.  After it passes this preliminary test they do more fundamental research into the company’s financial position.  I especially liked how they approach financial statements very skeptically.
Another key difference to Sionna’s approach is that they attempt to meet with the management of the firms they invest in.  The reason why they do this isn’t to find out more information, although they usually do, but it is to determine whether management is honest and trustworthy. 
Most value investors don’t bother meeting with management because they don’t find it worthwhile and it may even lead to a bad decision.  The reason is that most CEO's are typically quite charismatic and are able to sell ice to an Eskimo. 


If you are looking for a decent book to explain the value investing approach, I would recommend this book.  It provides enough information on both the quantitative and qualitative approaches to solid investing and doesn't waste pages with useless drivel.  As I like to say, most books could be written as a pamphlet and very few authors actually provide new material, chapter after chapter. 
While I understand why they use a relative value approach, I personally could never take such an approach.  I just can’t invest in something only because it is relatively cheap. 
If you are interested in learning how to determine the intrinsic value of a business, the model discussed in this book gives a solid framework on which to do that.  From there you have to dig deeper and look at other quantitative and qualitative measures that are discussed in the book. 

Best Regards,

P.S. I am currently reading Stress Test by Tim Geithner, and it is a fantastic book about the financial crisis.  I'm about half way through and so far I am fascinated at how the various government officials felt like they had to act during the crisis.   
Disclosure: Long MSFT

Monday, June 30, 2014

AutoCanada: CEO sell Millions

  • The CEO is selling between $115 and $150 million of AutoCanada stock.
  • The company is selling $200 million in equity, doubling its equity capital.
  • These actions confirm the overvaluation of AutoCanada.
In my recent article AutoCanada: An Easy Short, I demonstrated the overvaluation of AutoCanada (OTC:AOCIF) (TSE:ACQ). This thesis was recently validated when AutoCanada announced it was raising $200 million in equity. Beyond this, Canada One Auto Group (CAG) is selling $150-200 million of ACQ shares in a secondary offering. Both of these offerings are quite intriguing for different reasons, and will be investigated separately.

Click here to read the press release.

You can read the rest of the article here:

I sold the company, the CEO is selling the company, and senior management is selling the company.

That leaves the question, who would buy the company at the current price?

Best Regards,

Disclosure:  I am short ACQ

Saturday, June 14, 2014

Short Idea - AutoCanada (ACQ)


  • AutoCanada's market cap has exploded from $350 million to $2 billion in a year and a half.
  • AutoCanada's valuation is 3-4x higher than its US peers on a P/E, P/S, P/B, and P/CF basis.
  • The strong auto sales market over the past 4 years has been a huge tailwind. It will no longer have this tailwind going forward.
  • AutoCanada doesn't have voting control over some of its dealerships.
  • Analysts present the illusion of a huge number of acquisitions targets and unlimited growth in Canada. They truth is it only has 3x upside in Canada.

I don't typically share my stock purchases, but this is a unique situation in that I am shorting a stock and I am seeking to bring about a more rational price in the shortest time frame possible.

The stock is AutoCanada (OTC:AOCIF, TSE: ACQ), listed on the Toronto stock exchange. Simply put, the company owns and operates around 34 car dealerships in Canada. The reasons why I am short the stock are explained in the graph below.

To read the rest of this article click on link below:

Best Regards,
Kevin Graham

Disclosure:  Short ACQ

Saturday, May 24, 2014

EconTalk - Marc Andreessen

Every Monday morning I listen to EconTalk, a weekly podcast where Russ Roberts interviews various people of different backgrounds to discuss relevant economics issues.  Russ is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institute.  He is a fantastic interviewer, makes you think, and often discusses the "unintended" economic consequences of various economic ideas or policies. 

This past week Russ interviewed technology venture capitalist Marc Andreessen.  Mark is best known for co-creating the early web browser Mosaic, and later co-founded Netscape. 

The interview this past week between Russ and Marc was absolutely fantastic.  It is not very common for me to discuss these podcasts with friends/fellow investors but I couldn't resist after listening to this one.  They discussed the challenges of being a venture capitalist (predicting future trends in tech), how smartphones are causing a technology revolution around the world, how Bitcoin is so much more than a digital currency, and how technology has and will affect areas such as newspapers, healthcare, and education. 

The entire interview is great but I found the second half of the podcast to be outstanding.  As many investors understand, the newspaper industry has come under heavy pressure from the internet starting around 2007.  Newspapers, once fantastic businesses are now losing money and have lost their monopolistic dominance over local markets.  The internet now allows people to access news much faster and from different cities.  Marc discusses how the internet has fragmented newspapers and how competition is forcing them to change.  The local monopoly's they once enjoyed are over.  He also discusses the one gift that the internet has given to the newspaper industry.  Myself, like Russ and Marc believe there is still a market for good journalism and news but the future will look different than the past. 

Also, the discussions about Bitcoin, healthcare and education are all well worth the free price of this podcast.

You can stream or download the podcast here:


Kevin Graham

Monday, May 19, 2014

GDP & Stock Market Returns (DJIA)

Today I want to examine the relationship between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and stock market returns.  The purpose will be to determine if periods of strong economic growth correlate to strong stock market returns.  Does looking at the macro economic data help or hinder you as an investor?

Let's look at the data for the 20th century.  To begin we will examine stock market returns from 1900-2000.  For our purposes we will use the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), a common market index, as our proxy for overall market returns*.  It is one of the only indexes that has data going back that far. 

The first thing we notice from the graph is that stock markets over this 100 year period can be divided into six distinct periods of time.  The red highlighted periods indicate flat or down markets.  The green highlighted periods indicate upward or bull markets. 

The periods 1900-1921, 1929-1948, & 1966-1981 all saw flat or declining stock prices.  These were fairly long periods of time ranging from 15-21 year in length.  These flat markets accounted for 54.25 years. 

The periods 1921-Fall 1929, 1948-1966, & 1981-2000 all saw huge bull markets for the stock market.  These periods ranged in length from 8.75 years to 19 years.  The stock market gained between 9.8% to 21% annually over these periods.  These bull markets accounted for 45.75 years. 

Let's breakdown and look at the economic growth for each period of the above periods highlighted both red and green in the graph above. 


The first time period was from 1900 until 1921.  So what did GDP do during this period**?

It wasn't exactly smooth growth but for the entire period real GDP grew from $457 billion to $726 billion (all figures in 2009 dollars).  For this period GDP increased 59% or 2.2% annually.  Stock market increased by only 9% or 0.4% annually. 

1921 - Fall 1929

The second period was from 1921 to the fall of 1929, shown below.

During this time period the growth was consistently up with no down years.  Real GDP increased from $726 billion to $966 billion (end of period data used).  During this 9 year period GDP increase 33% or 3.2% annually.  In contrast, the stock market was on fire, increasing 430% or 21.0% annually.

Fall 1929 - 1948

The third period began with the Great Depression in the fall of 1929 lasted until 1948, shown below. 

This period began with a serious decline in real GDP (the Great Depression), but then growth rebounded.  Real GDP increased from $966 billion to $2,018 billion.  During this 18.25 year period real GDP increased 109% or 4.2% annually.  In contrast, the stock market went into a deep slump losing just over half if its value (-52%) or -4.0% annually.

1948 - 1966

The fourth period was from 1948 and lasted until 1966, shown below.

This period saw solid growth, once again, with a few down years.  For the entire period real GDP increased from $2,018 billion to $4,235 billion.  During this 18 year period real GDP increased 110% or 4.2% annually, almost exactly the same as the previous period.  The stock market finally woke up to the strong growth.  The DJIA increased from 181 to 969, increasing 435% or 9.8% annually.

1966 - 1981

The fifth period was from 1966 and lasted until 1981.  This period was marked by high inflation and other worries and is shown below.

This period again saw solid growth again with a few down years.  For the entire period real GDP increased from $4,235 billion to $6,611 billion.  During this 15 year period real GDP increased 56% or 3.0% annually.  The stock market however went into hibernation during this time.  The DJIA was essentially flat with the DJIA falling slightly from 969 to 964.  This equates to a 0.5% decrease for the entire period, or -0.0% annually. 

1981 - 2000

The sixth period was from 1981 and lasted until 2000, shown below.

This period began with a slight recession but once again saw solid growth.  For the entire period real GDP increased from $6,611 billion to $12,565 billion.  During this 19 year period real GDP increased 90% or 3.4% annually.  The stock market once again resumed it's upward march.  The DJIA increased from 964 to 11,497 during this time.  This was the longest bull market during the 20th century with the index increasing 1093% or 13.9% annually. 

To summarize the data, here are the results for the DJIA for each of the six periods. 

Taken as a whole, the DJIA increased from 66 to 11497 from 1900-2000.  During that time the DJIA rose 173 fold or 5.3% annually. 

The DJIA saw a total of 54.25 years of flat or declining values.  Remarkably the DJIA recorded all if its gains over a period of 45.75 years, or less than half of the time.  While economic growth was fairly constantly upward, the returns of the stock market were anything but steady. 

Here is a summary of the data for both real GDP (top table) and real GDP per capita (bottom table) for all six time periods. 

From the top table we can see that for the entire period real GDP grew 26.5 fold or 3.4% annually.  The first thing we can notice is that there was economic expansion during each of the six time periods.  While the growth was strong in some periods and weaker in others, overall it was fairly consistent in the 2-4% range. 

Out of curiosity I also calculated the numbers for real GDP per capita (the bottom table).  Due to population growth, real GDP per capita increased by 6.4 times during the 20th century or 2.0% annually. 

What I find ironic is that the highest level of real GDP per capita growth was during 1929 to 1948 where it increased by 3.2% annually.  This was a time when the stock market was cut in half but the standard of living increased immensely***. 


So what conclusions can be drawn from this?  Over the entire century, 1900-2000, real GDP grew at 3.4% annually and the stock market gained 5.3% annually.  As a whole, real GDP increased slowly and steadily between 2 to 4%.  The same can't be said for the stock market.  Over that same time period the stock market was flat or down 54.25% of the time, while the stock market was up only 45.75% of the time. 

Don't count on macro economic data to help you out in determining where the markets will head next year or next month. 

What about GDP and DJIA returns since 2000?

Here is the data here for your reference and amusement. 

Remarkably, the DJIA was flat for the first 12 years and has only started to rise since late 2012.  History seems to be repeating itself all over again. 

If the stock market rises 5.3% annually during the 21st century, the DJIA will reach 41,811 by 2025, 152,055 by 2050, and 2,011,044 by 2100. 

There will be a few new 52 week highs from the current DJIA level of 16,512.

Best Regards,

Kevin Graham

* DJIA Data Source: Samuel H. Williamson, "Daily Closing Values of the DJA in the United States, 1885 to Present," MeasuringWorth, 2014

** US GDP Data Source:  Samuel H. Williamson, "What Was the U.S. GDP Then?" MeasuringWorth, 2014.

***Standard of living is commonly measured by growth in real GDP.  While this may be one indicator of our standard of living, it is not a complete measure.  Today, many items we enjoy are free and some items have fallen in price yet have much higher quality and features than previous models and this is not reflected in standard GDP calculations. 

Sunday, April 20, 2014

Investment Risks - China and Market Valuations

The students of Columbia Business School publish an investment newsletter entitled Graham & Doddsville.  I was reading the winter issue on Saturday night and I came across an interesting comment by Jim Grant, publisher of Grant's Interest Rate Observer.  Grant has been commenting on the credit markets since 1983.  Here it is. 

Graham & Doddsville:  

Given the current state of the economy and the low interest rate environment, it sounds like you perceive risks that others do not. What facts, measures, or indications bother you most?

Jim Grant

Here’s a fact: China’s banking assets represent one-third of world GDP, whereas China’s economic output represents only 12% of world GDP. Never before has the world seen the likes of China’s credit bubble. It’s a clear and present danger for us all. 

And here’s a sign of the times: Amazon, with a trailing P/E multiple of more than 1,000, is preparing to build a new corporate headquarters in Seattle that may absorb more than 100% of cumulative net income since the company’s founding in 1994.   

Now, there are always things to worry about. Different today is the monetary policy backdrop. Which values are true? Which are inflated? In a time of zero percent interest rates, it’s not always easy to tell.

The risks in China have not gone away.  Here is an update on why.

As I have written before, defining risk is the most important aspect of investing.  Risk is not volatility, risk is permanent loss of capital.  The risks of the real estate bubble in China are huge and is a real reason to be defensive. 

Once this bubble in China bursts, Canada will not be spared.  We avoided the recession of 2007/2008 because of high commodity prices. 

To build 50 Manhattans between 2008-2012, a lot of commodities were used.  At the current pace in China, they could build 1 billion housing units in roughly 16 years.  I don't know how many housing units there are already in China but the math doesn't look real good.

Once commodity prices collapse, Canada will have its recession. 

Market Valuations

As Friday April 17th, the Price to Earnings (P/E) ratio of the Russell is now over 100x based on trailing earnings. 

To see current data, Click here:

I read elsewhere that nine companies in the Russell 2000 index have a P/E ratio of over 1000x.  Better yet, 1/4 of in companies in the Russell 2000 don't have any profits and so far this year they have outperformed the profitable companies by a three to one margin. 

I often wondered why Fairfax shorted the Russell back at the 661 level, roughly half the current level.  I don't wonder any more.  This market is completely irrational.   

Best Regards,


Disclosure: Long FFH

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Thoughts on Warren Buffett's 2013 Shareholder Letter

Below are my thoughts on portions of the 2013 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholder Letter.

To read the entire letter CLICK HERE.

As I’ve long told you, Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. Moreover, the difference has widened considerably in recent years. That’s why our 2012 decision to authorize the repurchase of shares at 120% of book value made sense. Purchases at that level benefit continuing shareholders because per-share intrinsic value exceeds that percentage of book value by a meaningful amount.

The writing on the wall doesn't get any clearer than this. Buffett thinks that Berkshire (BRK) is worth much, much more than book value and he will be aggressive at buying back stock at the 120% level from any shareholder willing to sell.  This is interesting because BRK is selling at 131% of book value. It was selling for around 120% of book value earlier this year.  Do what you want with that but the implications are clear.

Over the stock market cycle between yearends 2007 and 2013, we overperformed the S&P. Through full cycles in future years, we expect to do that again. If we fail to do so, we will not have earned our pay. After all, you could always own an index fund and be assured of S&P results.

This is an interesting comment because Buffett has laid out some guidelines in the back of the annual report on a 5 year yardstick that compares BRK's performance to that of the S&P 500.  It is true that BRK did not meet this test and that Buffett seems to have changed his yardstick to 6 years now.   

Over the past 5 years the per share book value of BRK has risen 91% while the S&P 500 index has gained 127%.  What I find interesting is that the per share book value of the S&P 500 has risen roughly only 50% over that same period.

Take from that what you want but to me the implications are clear.  Either BRK is cheap, the S&P 500 is overvalued, or some combination of the two.  My vote is BRK is cheap.

We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.

Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don’t report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

This is what I love about owning Berkshire.  They continually make good long term investments, which ensure good long term results.  BRK is a conglomerate that will be prospering a century from now... long after Buffett is dead and gone.  The market is currently willing to value the latest hot tech stock at absurd levels while BRK underperforms the broader market.  Let's be clear, BRK is built to last. 

Berkshire’s extensive insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2013 – that makes 11 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 11-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $77 billion. Concurrently, our underwriting profit has aggregated $22 billion pre-tax, including $3 billion realized in 2013. And all of this all began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund... 

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. 

To put this is simple language, BRK has a $77 billion revolving fund (or loan).  I like to think of it as a loan but a loan that has a number of unique features.  First you never have to pay it back, so long as BRK's insurance companies are still operating.  Second, the loan has a negative interest rate.  In 2013 BRK was paid 3.9% to hold this loan.  Talk about having your cake and eating it too!

Now the lingering question in my mind is what is a loan like this worth, specifically one that has an indefinite term and a zero interest rate (assuming a long term combined ratio of 100%)? 

To give a simple answer this from a financial perspective you must turn to the perpetuity formula, where PV= C/d.  "PV" is the present value, "C" is the annual investment return, and "d" is the discount rate.  Assuming BRK can earn 10% on it's float and it doesn't grow from here, the annual investment return would be $7.7 billion. 

From here it is easy to see that choosing a discount rate of 10% gives a present value of $77 billion dollars for the float.  If we choose a 15% discount rate the present value is $51 billion.  Similarly if we choose a 5% discount rate the float is worth $154 billion. 

So what is the true value the float?  Make your own assumptions but Buffett makes it clear that the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.  I totally agree and in the past, given the investment returns it has generated for BRK, the liability was perhaps ZERO.

Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge.

In layman's terms, If BRK can earn 10% on that incremental invested capital beyond the depreciation charge, it will add approximately $550 million in annual earnings. 

In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S&P 500, both Todd Combs and Ted Weschler handily did so. Each now runs a portfolio exceeding $7 billion. They’ve earned it.

I must again confess that their investments outperformed mine. (Charlie says I should add “by a lot.”) If such humiliating comparisons continue, I’ll have no choice but to cease talking about them. 

Todd and Ted have also created significant value for you in several matters unrelated to their portfolio activities. Their contributions are just beginning: Both men have Berkshire blood in their veins. 

Looks like BRK has some top notch talent in line to take over the equity portfolio.  I find the comment in the last paragraph quite interesting.  To me it is foreshadowing a larger role in the company for either Todd or Ted.  Perhaps one will be the next CEO.

Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don’t report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

Buffett here is describing the "look through" earnings of the companies which BRK is a part owner of(common stock).  I wonder how many investors could actually tell you the "look through" earnings of their own portfolio?  That result might prove to be an interesting for many so called value investors. 


There is another fantastic portion of the BRK annual letter that I would highly recommend.  It is an essay entitled, "Some Thoughts About Investing".  In this essay Buffett compares buying a 400 acre farm north of Omaha and a commercial real estate investment to investing in common stocks.  The principles are exactly the same.

At the end of the annual report you will find the two page offer Buffett took over to purchase Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, the Financial Statement for Nebraska Furniture Mart for the yearend 1946, and a fantastic memo on the "Pitfalls of Pension Promises" by Buffett from 1975.  Click Here to read these sections.  They are located at the end of the annual report.   

Best Regards,

Kevin Graham

Disclosure - long BRK.b

Tuesday, March 4, 2014

2013 US Bank Asset Quality

Citigroup finally released their 10-K this past weekend allowing me to compare the asset quality of the four large banks in the US.  I always like to see what percentage of the assets are the so call "marked to fantasy" assets.  These assets, also called Level 3 Assets, are valued by management WITHOUT any market comparables.  Management basically values them at whatever they want so long as they can convince the auditors that the rationale is not unreasonable. 

This year Bank of America takes top honors, while JPM comes in last.  The rankings haven't changed much over the years other than BAC has overtaken WFC for top spot. 

I am amazed at how quickly Brian Moynihan has cleaned up the books at BAC.  Level 3 assets were around two and half times the current amount only two years ago.  Today, even if you discount the book value by the $32 billion of mark to fantasy assets, you can still buy the company at an $11 billion dollar discount.  I can't resist a bargain. 

I have commented on balance sheet of JPM in the past.  In particular, I noted before the London Whale incident that you could drive a truck through their balance sheet (Read Here: Bank of America & Europe).  Then after the losses from the incident were exposed, I couldn't resist and bought a whole bunch of JPM (Read Here: Why JPM Is Cheap). 

As I read the annual reports of the various banks I found the disclosure this year is better than ever.  The US financials have never been in better shape.  They are soundly capitalized and the quality of the assets have never been better.

The results of the stress tests can't come soon enough. 

Best Regards,

Disclosure: Long WFC, BAC Class A warrants and JPM warrants


Saturday, March 1, 2014

2013 Berkshire Hathaway's Shareholder Letter

Today is the day Warren Buffett releases his annual letter to shareholders.  Grab a coffee and enjoy the words of wisdom from this investment icon.



Disclosure - Long BRK.b